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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRANDTJEN & KLUGE, INC._ 
a corporation of the State of Minnesota. 
Plaintiff & Appellant 
vs. 
C. JEAN SHONKA & ANNA E. ERICKSON 
dba Acme Multigraph Co., 
Brigham City. Utah. 
Defendants & Respondents 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 8112 
On the 17th day of September, 1951 the defendants 
herein made a payment of $50.00 (Ex. D-11) to the plaintiff 
upon a purchase order contract for one 12 x 18 Kluge Platen 
Press dated October 18, 1951. This contract provided that 
the Seller would furnish a competent man to install the 
equipment and his expense while so doing would be borne 
by the Seller. 
Thereafter at an unknown date, but prior to November 
27, 1951, plaintiff through its agent one G. H. Ra~ymond 
(Ex. D-6) induced defendants to execute an instrument 
purported to be a release of the plaintiff company's obliga-
tion to furnish a competent man to im;tall the equipment, 
upon the reprcRcntation of the said Agent, G. II. Raymond, 
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that he would install and give training on the machine. De-
fendants advised plaintiff by this same purported release, 
of their complete lack of experience with or knowledge 
about the press or its function. That thereafter on Novem-
ber 27, 1951 a conditional sales contract for the purchase 
and sale of this equipment was entered into by the parties 
and defendants paid an additional $385.35 to plaintiff. On 
December 6, 1951 part of the equipment weighing approxi-
mately 3,000 pounds was delivered to the defendants' place 
of business at Brigham City and there left in the crates un-
til April 5th or 6th, 1952. 
About the middle of December, 1951, the plaintiff's 
agent, G. H. Raymond, telephoned defendants from Salt 
Lake and advised that he would install the machine then or 
during the 2nd week of .January (Ex. D-13) but which he 
did not do. The installment due on the contract was made 
on December 27, 1952 by the defendants. The machine re-
mained uncrated in the middle of defendants' floor and on 
February 22nd defendants wrote plaintiff's agent, Ray-
mond, and also mailed a copy of said letter directly to the 
plaintiff's home office (Ex. D-13), objecting to the failure 
to have the machine installed and the difficulty in having 
to make payments while the machine remained idle. Noth-
ing at all was done by plaintiff or its agents to place tht 
machine in operating condition, and on March 29th, after 
other correspondence, defendants caused a letter to be writ-
ten to plaintiff (Ex. P-13) advising plaintiff that if imme-
diate arrangements for the installation were made and 
training given defendants would bring their payments up 
to date. 
On April 5th plaintiff's agent, G. H. Raymond, uncrated 
and assembled the machine and pushed it into position in 
the shop of the defendants, The machine was not levelled 
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nor bolted to the floor as would be necessary to complete an 
installation. (R- 220,222). Raymond then advised the de-
fendants that the rollers were not there but that he would 
have them sent in in a week or so and that he would come 
over and complete the installation and give instruction (R. 
153, 159, 161). The rollers, however, were never sent or 
the installation completed nor was there any offer or ten-
der of delivery or completion Hearing nothing further 
from plaintiff or its agents for 16 days defendants on 
April 22nd advised plaintiff of their recision of the contract 
and tendered back the machinery upon return of defen-
dants' money paid on said machine (Ex. D-8). 
Thereafter, without offering to complete performance 
under said contract, the plaintiff commenced this action 
under the said contract of November 27, 1951 (R-1). 
Upon these facts the Court properly gave judgment in 
favor of the defendants for the restoration of the moneys 
expended by them in completing their part of the contract 
up to the time of the recision. 
ARGUlVIENT 
Respondents' argument will be directed in sequence to 
plaintiff's statement of points upon which it relies for the 
reversal of the judgment. 
As to Point No. 1, appellant cites the general rule that 
a party is not entitled to both recision and restoration of his 
advancements and damages for a breach of contract, and 
with which authority Respondents have no argument. 
However, upon the precise point involved, that of whether 
or not moneys necessarily expended in performance of a 
contract by one party should be properly restored where a 
recision has taken place, Appellant offered no authority. 
Under this contract or contracts, if the Court has construed 
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all of the documents as constituting a contract between the 
parties, Respondents were obligated to keep this particu-
lar equipment at their address at 11 West Forest Street at 
Brigham City, Utah, and to there keep the property insured 
at least to the amount owing to the plaintiff and appellent. 
To comply with the contract then, Respondents necessarily 
had to have the property shipped to Brigham City and 
hence the freight could and should be considered an item 
of necessary expense to Respondents in performing their 
end of the contract. As Appellant points out in 12 Am. Jur. 
1038 the effect of a recision is to- "Put the parties back 
in the same position they were in prior to the making of 
a contract.--", and the courts use the language "return to 
status quo". In the case of Edwards vs Miller 228 Pac. 
1105, an Oklahoma case, there is ~ontained a discussion of 
the question of what is necessary in order to return the 
parties to status quo, and in that case, a reverse situation 
from the instant case, it was said in order to return a con-
tracting party to the status quo only the money actually 
paid out in good faith in putting the contract into affect, 
wiuld necessarily have to be restored. It would seem, 
therefore, that the Court could properly take the view that 
the $157.28 expended for freight was a necessary and 
proper item of expense in carrying into effect the contract 
by the Respondents. And clearly there is no authority to 
the contrary furnished by the Appellant, and none was dis-
covered by this writer in checking this point. 
As to Point No 2 Appellant takes the somewhat incon-
sistant view that the original contract, promissory note, 
and conditional sales contract should be contrued together 
but that Appellant's obligation is controlled exclusively by 
the first or purchase order contract and cannot be enlarged 
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trial have and do not now have any objections to the appli-
cation of the rule of law requiring all the written documents 
to be construed togehter in determining the ultimate con-
tract of the parties. But this rule of law cited by Appel-
lant would. certainly include as one of the written docu-
ments forming part of the same transaction and executed in 
connection with the transaction the entire Exhibit D-6. 
Appellant itself of course relies upon Ex. P-2 and so it 
would necessarily have to form a part of the controct. And 
as will be covered more fully under Point No. 3, if Ex. P-2 
does form a part of the contract then certainly the written 
representations of the Appellant through its agent should 
and was held. to be admissable by the Court. 
Appellant's argument seems to be that because the six 
rollers were specifically excluded from the list of standard 
equipment on the purchase order contract that they were 
not bound to furnish rollers. However, the contract speaks 
for itself and on the purchase order agreement is the fol-
lowing language "Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., due to varying 
climatic conditions, does not guarantee the supply of rollers 
to meet local requirements, and the rollers supplied are fur-
nished free of charge for the convenience of the erector in 
completing the installation". So that while the contract 
excludes rollers from the standard equipment the contract 
just as surely makes them a part of the equipment that will 
be furnished, but upon which no guarantee of suitability 
to climate is made. But certainly the purchase order con-
tract contemplated the furnishing of rollers and the subse-
quent or November 27th contract merely put that into 
words when it used the language "with 6 rollers and all 
standard equipment." (Ex. P-3). 
Under its same Point No. 2 Appellant contends that 
tht rule in the State of Utah that in cases of doubt or am-
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biguity the contract will be construed more strongly against 
the writer thereof, is not followed and cites Caine vs. Hagen· 
berth, but the Hagenberth case uses the language which we 
contend for, that if there is an ambiguity then of course it 
will be construed most strongly against the user of the lan-
guage in determining the meaning, and by the very lan-
guage which Appellant uses, the rule will be applied to avoid 
a forfeiture, and by its action Appellant seel<:s to work a 
forfeiture of all previous payments made upon this contract 
by the Respondents herein. So that by the rule that Counsel 
cites in order to avoid a forfeiture the Court may well apply 
the rule of construction most strongly against the writer 
of the contract. 12 Am. J ur. P. 795 sets the rule out as 
follows: 
"Doubtful language in contracts should be interpreted 
most strongly against the parties who use it. A writ-
ten agreement should in case of doubt be interpreted 
against the party who has drawn it. Sometimes the 
rule is stated to be that where doubt exists as to the 
interpretation of an instrument prepared by one party 
upon the faith of which the other has incurred an ob-
ligation, that interpretation will be adopted which will 
be favorable to the latter. It is said that an instru-
ment uncertain as to its terms is to be most strongly 
contrued against the party thereto who causes such an 
uncertainty to exist. - - - - " 
In our case, of course, the plaintiff, Brandtjen & Kluge 
prepared all contracts entered into by the parties and hence 
the construction should be taken most favorable to the de-
fendants if there is doubt in its meaning. 
But in answering Appellant's argument we have per-
mitted the application of the first rule of construction to 
follow rather than precede. This rule, of course, is the 
universally accepted one, that plain language is to be given j 
its plain and literal meaning. 
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as used in the contract (Ex. P-3) sued upon by plaintiff, 
can have only one plain and literal meaning; that is, that 
in addition to the standard equipment will be furnished 6 
rollers, and of course as pointed out this literal construc-
tion of the wording coincides with the contemplation of the 
purchase order contract of October 18th. 
In its argument that defendants waived installation of 
the press under Point No. 3 Appellant says: 
"The defendants, after some correspondence with the 
agent (dark print added) that had sold the machine, 
sent to the plaintiff a letter. (Ex. P-2). 
The significant point there is that not only the Respondents 
but the Appellant as well regarded the man Raymond as the 
agent of the company, as did the Court at the trial. As 
to these Respondents the representation of the agent Ray-
mond (Ex. D-6) was as much a representation of Appellant 
as any other correspondence or writing from the company 
could have been. The Appellant knew that the Respon-
dents had no knowledge of the machine and would have to 
have some tr,aining in the use of the machine, and the posi-
tion of the Respondents in this regard is that the Appellant 
itself induced the execution of the change, modification or 
release, by and through its agent Raymond and now seek to 
call the release a voluntary release, while as a matter of 
fact Appellant's real state of mind was shown by its letter 
of April 3, 1952 (Ex. D-7) wherein they say:-
" - - - - You state that there is no consideration for the 
release of Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., from the obligation 
to install the equipment. I think the release of Brandt-
jen & Kluge, Inc., is based on the consideration of their 
completing the contract of purchase by your client by 
the shipment of the equipment and the completion of 
the offer to buy submitted by your client in its altered 
form. - - - - " 
It would seem that the Appellant faces a dilemna, one 
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v 
horn of which would be if there is a consideration for the 
release executed by the Respondents it would necessarily 
have to be the promise of their agent, G. H. Raymond, to 
install and. give training on the machine, and if they are 
not bound through their agent to so install and give train-
ing on the machine, then there is no consideration for the 
release. 
The law applicable to this situation it seems would be found 
in 12 Am. Jur. Section 412, Page 990: 
"Any new agreement between the parties to an exist-
ing executory contract, made in substitution or modifi-
cation of the elder compact and bilateral in benefit or 
burden, has, like the primary contract a sufficient 
consideration in the mutual advantages or obligations 
which it conferes or imposes. Where an agreement 
amounts to a waiver or discharge of mutual stipulations 
in a contract either in whole or in part, the discharge 
of each by the other from the obligations of the con-
tract may furnish a sufficient consideration. How-
ever, there is insufficient consideration in the absence 
of such reciprocity. Each party must gain or lose 
something by the change. If the benefit or detriment 
is unilateral, a consideration is lacking where it is a 
widely recognized and well established legal principle 
that doing or undertaking to do only that which one is 
already under a legal obligation to do by his contract is 
no consideration for another's agreement to do what he 
is not already under legal obligation to do. Doing or 
promising to do that which one is already bound to do 
is not a legal detriment. If one party to a contract in 
agreeing upon a modification of it either assumes an 
additional obligation or renounces any right, promise 
of the other is nudum pactum and void. That the 
modification is supported by the consideration of the 
prior contract has been denied. - - - - " 
Cited under this section are cases in support thereof as 
follows: 
"An executory agreement by the landlord to reduce the 
amount of rent which the tenant is bound by the terms 
of a written lease to pay, made during the term of the 
lease without cancelling it or surrendering the premis-
es, where no change is made in the character of the 
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tenancy or the state of the premises to the tenant's 
disadvantage or the landlord's benefit is a nude pact 
without consideration and void. Goldsborough vs. 
Gable, 140 Ill. 269, 2 N. E. 722, 15 L.R.A. 294." 
Another case cited thereunder is as follows: 
"An oral agreement by a landlord in a written lease for 
a term of years under seal to accept in the future a re-
duced rent from the tenant without any other change 
whatsoever in the terms of the lease or any corres-
ponding benefit to the landlord or detriment to the 
tenant, even when followed by an acceptance of the re-
duced sum and the giving of receipts therefor, is void 
for want of consideration of the payment in whole or 
part by the tenant of the rent he had agreed to pay 
being insufficient. Coe vs. Hobby, 72 New York 141, 
28 Am Rep 120, Durband vs. Nicholson, 205 Iowa 1264, 
216 N.W. 278, 219 N.W. 318, citing RCL stating that 
there must be a new detriment or benefit." 
From this we see that there was absolutely no consideration 
for the defendants' release of the obligation of plaintiff to 
perform under the contract by installing the machine, un-
less the man, Raymond, was the agent of plaintiff and in 
fact a new promise to install and give training was made 
by the plaintiff through its agent Raymond. In either 
event of course, plaintiff must fail in this action by reason 
of his non-performance of either the original agreement to 
furnish a competent man to install, or tq have the man 
Raymond install and give training, and the failure to de-
liver the rollers. The court quite logically took the view 
that Raymond was the agent of the appeallant in making 
the promises (R 92). 
Taking the Appellant's view that several instruments 
constitute the ultimate contract between the parties then 
the purported release as contained in Appellant's Exhibit 
P-2 can be nothing more nor less than a consent to a change 
or modification, and this of course is the view that the Ap-
pellant took in its letter above cited (Ex. D-7), and hence 
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even by the authority cited by the Appellant there would 
necesarily have to be a consideration for a modification or 
·change. 
Appellant's argument under Points No. 4 and No. 5 is 
somewhat repetitious of previous points, particularly the ar-
gument that because the 6 rollers were excluded from the 
list of standard equipment that the Appellant was relieved 
of the obligation to deliver said 6 rollers. As to the point 
that the finding that 6 rollers had not been delivered by 
Appellant to the Respondents and that the said machine had 
not been installed as being contrary to the evidence, at the 
risk of repeating it is pointed out again that the contract 
entered into on the 18th day of October, 1951, contained 
the provision heretofore mentioned: 
"'Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., due to varying and climatic 
conditions does not guarantee to supply rollers to meet 
local requirements and the rollers supplied are furnish-
ed free of charge for the convenience of the erector in 
completing installation." 
and. seems to conclusively meet the argument of Appellant 
that because rollers were not part of the standard equip-
ment they were not to be furnished by the seller. And 
while at the trial Appellant made no apparent claim that 
rollers were never delivered, every witness testifying on 
the subject either denied delivery of any rollers or explain-
ed the difference between rollers and roller cores and stated 
that what they saw were roller cores (Shonka R-212, Erick-
son R.-140, Hall R.-211). 
As to that part of Point No. 5 claiming that the find-
ing "and said machine was not installed" is contrary to the 
evidence, the record is clear that everyone who saw the ma-
chine was in agreement that the machine was not installed. 
One witness, Charles W. Claybaugh, (R.-181) who testified 
he had been in the newspaper and printing business 30 
10 
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years and who had testified that he had made millions of 
impressions upon a similar machine (R.-182), gave answers 
concerning an inspection of the machine at the offices of 
the Respondents in September, 1952, as follows (R-186): 
"Q. Did you find at the time you examined this press 
that it was installed and ready to print? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you find parts in the back room and a way from 
the press? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Parts that would be essential in the printing opera-
tion? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And were some of these parts still crated? 
A. Yes, sir." 
Again at Record-185: 
"Q. Thank you. These cast rollers, would you state 
again what function they perform? 
A. They transfer the ink from the ink platen to the 
form that is being printed, by rolling over the 
form. 
Q. Would it be possible to accomplish any printing 
without these cast rollers? 
A. No, sir." . 
And again at Record 188: 
Q. Do you know whether or not there were core roll-
ers on the machine at the time you looked at it? 
A. I am not positive but I do not believe so. 
Q. Do you know whether or not there was an addi-
tional set of core rollers in the crate? 
A. I am sure of that. 
Q. Do you know whether or not there were two sets 
of core rollers? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know whether or not just one of them was 
still crated? 
A. I can't remember for sure but I know that the 
crate contained the core rollers." 
And again at Record-193 on Cross Examination by Mr. 
Mann: 
"Q. Now, Mr. Call agked you if thiR machine waR in-
stalled and ready to print. The machine thn t you 
saw, was that installed with exception of the cast 
11 
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rollers? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What did it lack? 
A. It wasn't fastened to the floor in any way, an-
chored, nor was the electrical equipment attach-
ed." 
On the same question of installation and delivery of rol· 
lers Mr. Edward C. Hall who testified he was President of 
the Sun Lithograph Company at Salt Lake City and had 
been engaged in the printing and lithography business for 
30 years. testified beginning at Record-210: 
"Q. Are you acquainted with the Kluge machine? 
A. Yes, I have operated them myself. 
Q. Would you be acquainted with what is designated 
as a 12 x 18 Kluge Platen Press? 
A. I would. 
Q. And you are familiar with all the various parts 
and workings of that machine? 
A. lam. 
Q. Are you acquainted with the defendants Miss 
Erickson and Miss Shonka in this case? 
A. I am. 
Q. Have you ever been to their business office in Brig-
ham City? 
A. Yes, I have, several times. 
Q. Did you ever see a 12 x 18 Kluge Press in their of-
fices? 
A. I have. 
Q. Do you remember when the first time was that you 
saw the press there ? 
A. No, I don't recall exactly, 
Q. Can you give us your best estimate of the time? 
A. I would say about a year ago or more. 
Q. Did you have occasion to examine the press at that 
time? 
A. Well, I just examined it. That was all, and no-
ticed that it was a new press. 
Q. Do you know whether or not there were any rol-
lers on the press at that time? 
A. I don't recall seeing any. 
Q. Do you know the difference between a roller and a 
roller core ? 
A. Yes, I know the difference. 
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A. Well, a core is the inside part of the roller. The 
roller is termed as a complete roller ready to put 
on the press to distribute ink which is a very es-
sential part of the press as far as the press is con-
cerned. 
Q. Is it possible to accomplish any printing with a 
roller core? 
A. None whatsover. 
Q. Is it essential that the roller, that the complete 
roller be on the machine ? 
A. That is correct." 
On Record 213 to the question: 
"Q. Based on your own experience in installing these 
machines do you have an opinion as to whether or 
not the Kluge machine which you saw in the of-
fices of the Acme Multigraph Company was in-
stalled?" , 
was made the following answer after some argument by 
counsel: 
"A. From my observation I would say the press was 
not installed. It was just sitting there. 
Q. What remained to be done? 
A. I would say just a general installation job. 
Q. Did you observe whether or not the machine was 
bolted to the floor? 
A. No, it wasn't sitting in a position where it could 
be in proper operating position at the time I saw it. 
Q. Did you have occasion to look at it to see whether 
or not it was bolted to the floor? 
A. Yes, I could see that. 
Q. Was it bolted? 
A. No, it wasn't. 
Q. Do you have an opinion whether or not bolting to 
the floor would be necessary for such a machine in 
such a location? 
(Argument of counsel as to objection.) 
A. From my experience I would say the machine 
would have to be bolted for an installation of that 
kind because of the walk. 
Q. What do you mean by the term "walk"? 
A. It would move and shift position. 
Q. Now, did you see this machine more than once? 
A. Yes, I saw it several times at my calls at the 
Acme Multigraph Company. 
Q. You testified that the first time was approximate-
13 
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ly one year ago and you have seen it since that 
time? 
A. I would say it has been in the past year, year and 
a half. 
Q. When was the last time you saw the machine? 
A. Late last summer I think it was. 
Q. That would be late in the summer of 1952 '? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At any time you saw the machine did it appear to 
be installed? 
A. No~ I would say it wasn't. In fact, I know it 
wasn't installed because an installation for a piece 
of equipment of that caliber should be levelled and 
bolted to the floor with the electrical equipment 
hooked up and in running condition." 
And again upon cross-examination by Mr. Mann (R.-222) 
to the question: 
"Q. What would this press weigh, do you know? 
A. I would say in the neighborhood of 3,000 pounds. 
Q. And you would say that would still walk if it were 
not bolted down ? 
A. Yes, sir. I have owned and opera ted those presses 
myself so I happen to know. 
Mr. Mann: I believe that is all." 
And on redirect examination by Mr. Call: 
"Q. Did you install the machine you sold or super-
vise its installation? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know whether or not the floor over there 
is level? 
A. No, it isn't absolutely level. 
Q. It requires shims? 
A. Yes." 
The Appellant's own witness, Anthone Petersen, in his 
testimony (R.-207) left no doubt as to whether or not the 
machine would walk without being bolted when he answer-
ed to the question "Will it walk if it is not bolted to the 
floor? A. Not if it is level." 
From the testimony of the witness, Hall, that the floor 
in the offices of the Respondents was unlevel and required 
shimming and the incontroverted evidence that such a ma-
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chine would walk, the Court could certainly find that the 
machine had not been installed. And again it seems that 
the Court could conclude from the contract of October 18, 
1951, heretofore quoted concerning the supplying of rollers 
for the convenience of the erector and not as items of 
standard equipment, that such a machine could not in fact 
be properly installed without rollers and a chance to test 
the machine. Certainly the Court was entitled. to conclude· 
that there had been no installation of this equipment. 
Under Point No. 6 Appellant claims that any breach 
committed by it was slight and equity should therefore deny 
rescision. To this, attention is 0alled to the fact that these 
defendants were novices in the printing business, knew 
nothing of the machine that they were purchasing, nor 
about its operation. Respondents repeatedly corresponded 
with Appellant advising it of these facts and demanding 
performance of their contract in order that printing could 
be accomplished and the machine would not sit in the middle 
of their floor in a condition of utter uselessness as to these 
Respondents. (Ex. D-13 and D-14). That finally, when 
threatened with rescision of the contract. (Ex. D-15) the 
agent Raymond did come and uncrate the equipment 
(nearly 4 months after the delivery thereof) and assembled 
the same, but did not install it, by any stretch of the 
imagination and even by his own admission that he would be 
back to put on the rollers and give them instruction. 
It must be remembered that this was a complicated 
3,000 pound printing press, the installation of which, as tes-
tified to by the witness Hall and permitted to go in the re-
cord by the Court although an objection to the question was 
sustained, was that 
"The custom and trade for a piece of equipment to bf' 
installed would be a professional erector or machinist 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to go out and see that the press is properly installed and 
serviced, ready for operatwn. It is turned over and 
demonstrated.'' 
Both the witness Hall and the witness Claybaugh saw the 
machine subsequent to the time when Appellant contends 
the installation was completed by it. 
Under these circumstances it seems unreasonable for 
Appellant to complain that the denial by the trial court of its 
demand for forfeiture was inequitable. 
Further, it cannot be said that the breach is slight or 
inconsequential when it goes to the very heart of the thing 
contracted for. In purchasing a printing machine these 
defendants were contracting for an instrument which would 
turn out printing and for the purposes of printing it is 
hard to conceive of anything more essential to the operation 
than the rolers or the complete installation of such a ma-
chine by persons qualified to install it. 
12 Am Jurat Page 1022 states: 
"----It has been said that if all parts of the contract 
are interdependent, so that one part cannot be violated 
without violating the whole, a breach by one party of a 
material part will discharge the whole at the option of 
the other party. Ordinarily however the circumstan-
ces attending the breach, the intention with which it 
was submitted, and its effect on the other party (dark 
print added) and on the general object sought to be ac-
complished by the contract must be considered in deter-
mining whether the breach will operate as a discharge. 
If the circumstances are such as manifest an intention 
on the part of the party in default to abandon the con· 
tract or not to comply with its terms in the future, 
or if by reason of the br·each the object sought to be ef-
fected is rendered impossible of accomplishment accord-
ing to the original design of the parties (dark print 
added) the breach will operate as a discharge of the 
whole contract unless waived." 
See also Sorensen vs. LaRue, an Idaho case in 252 Pac. 
494 and Shupe vs. Thede, an Iowa case in 218 N.W. 611. 
And it may be pointed out that another test applied by 
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courts on occasion is the test of substantial performance 
which is the test of whether or not the contracting party 
has obtained substantially what he bargained for, that is, 
has the benefit of the contract been secured by the parties. 
To this we state that without installation of the machine 
and without delivery of the essential six rollers these defen-
dants have no more received the benefits of the contract 
they entered into than if the entire machine had never been 
sent. To say otherwise would be like saying that a person 
purchasing a new car had received the benefit of his con-
tract by delivery of a car to him without wheels or without 
a motor. '".rhe thing for which the contract was made has 
never been accomplished until such time as it can be used 
for the purpose for which it was purchased, and defendants, 
by all the testimony in the record, including the testimony 
of plaintiff's erector Anthon Petersen, have never been 
able to accomplish even one job of printing. 
Further, by its letter of April 3rd (Ex. D-7) Appellant 
made it plain that it was not bound and did not intend to be 
bound by any provision of any contract requiring it to in-
stall the equipment, wherein it is said: 
" - -- - I am sorry but Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., state 
that they feel that they hav-e completed their full obli-
gation under the contract of purchase with your client 
The Acme Multigraph Company, and they advise me 
that unless the contract is discharged by Acme Multi-
graph Company in accordance with the agreement it 
will be necessary to proceed against the equipment un-
der the contract. 
Very truly yours, 
BRANDTJEN & KLUGE, INC. 
By /s/ R. D. Meyer 
R.D.MEYER" 
Certainly, upon rereipt of that letter Respondents were en-
titled to rescind the contract as they did and demand back 
the money spent by them on said contract. And, in res-
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cinding, Respondents offered to surrender the machine to 
Appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents earnestly contend in the instant caRe that 
appellant was obligated to furnish the printing machine, 
complete with the essential six rollers, and to install the 
same; that neither was done by appellant though repeated 
requests were made by respondents, and in fact appeallant 
expressed by its correspondence and implied by its acts that 
it had no intention of completing its contract and commen-
ced this action for termination and forfeiture without offer-
ing or tendering performance; that respondents were en-
titled to and did properly rescind the contract and tendered ( 
the return of the machine; and that upon the facts, upon the 
law, and upon equity, the court was completely justified in 
granting judgment to respondents, and his decisoin should 
be sustained and respondents given their costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OMER J. CALL 
Attorney for Respondents 
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